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The Italian position in the energy
and climate change negotiations
Carlo Viviani*
Prime Minister’s Office, Department for European Affairs;
LUISS “Guido Carli” University, Roma
 Climate change, security and cost of energy supplies and the competitiveness of
firms and economies have been focal points of the general political and
economic policy debate in recent years. This article examines the choices in this
field made at global level with the Kyoto Protocol and in Europe with the more
recent “20-20-20” package from the standpoints of the Italian national interests
and the negotiating stance adopted by our Government in European and
international forums. The European negotiations on renewable energy sources,
the reduction of emissions in the sectors with and without emissions trading
schemes, automobile emissions, the auctioning of emission rights, and the
identification of industries exposed to the risk of delocalization (carbon leakage)
are described in detail and the reasons for Italy’s positions set forth. The
principle guiding Italian negotiators has been to balance the various policy
aims, in an effort to ensure that the necessary action against climate change
does not have excessive repercussions on growth and employment. The principle
is all the more valid in the global talks on the regime that will succeed the Kyoto
Protocol when it expires on 1 January 2013. Without a credible global
agreement entailing an equivalent commitment, or sectoral agreements,
instruments will be needed to prevent Europe’s climate commitment from
producing an unfair competitive disadvantage, with potentially serious social
and economic consequences but no appreciable environmental advantage.
* The opinions expressed are the author’s alone and do not imply any responsibility 
or endorsement by the institutions mentioned. Address for correspondence:
c.viviani@governo.it.
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1 World Commission on Environment and Development (1987), Our Common Future
(Brundtland Report), Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. On-line at
http://www.un-documents.net/wced-ocf.htm.
2 IPCC (1998), “Principles Governing IPCC Work.” Vienna, 1-3 October. On-line at:
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/ipcc-principles/ipcc-principles.pdf. 
3 IPCC (1990), “First Assessment Report.” On-line at:
http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ publications_and_data_reports.htm.
1. The origins of climate policy
The debate over the reality of climate change and its causes forms
part of a broader debate on the human impact on the environment
dating at least as far back, institutionally, as the UN Conference on the
Human Environment in Stockholm in 1972. Stockholm spawned a
series of analyses and policy measures: the creation at the conference
itself of the UN Environment Programme, the Brundtland Report
adopted by the UN in 1987,1 which defined “sustainable development”
as “development which meets the needs of the present without
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own
needs”, and the Rio Conference of 1992, which set out Agenda 21.
In 1988 UNEP and the World Metereological Organization (WMO)
created the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC),
whose purpose is to evaluate the impact of human action on climate
change: “The role of the IPCC is to assess on a comprehensive,
objective, open and transparent basis the scientific, technical and
socio-economic information relevant to understanding the scientific
basis of risk of human-induced climate change, its potential impacts
and options for adaptation and mitigation.”2
The Intergovernmental Panel’s first report in 1990 created the
conditions for the adoption, at Rio De Janeiro in 1992, of the UN
Framework Convention on Climate Change.3 It is worth quoting the
first few paragraphs of the introduction, which in practice have
underpinned the IPCC’s work in these two decades:
“We are certain of the following:
“There is a natural greenhouse effect which already keeps the
Earth warmer than it would otherwise be;
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“Emissions resulting from human activities are substantially
increasing the atmospheric concentrations of the greenhouse gases:
carbon dioxide, methane, chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and nitrous
oxide. These increases will enhance the greenhouse effect, resulting
on average in an additional warming of the Earth’s surface. The main
greenhouse gas, water vapour, will increase in response to global
warming and further enhance it.”
Article 2 specifies the ultimate objective of the Convention as the
“stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a
level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with
the climate system” (mitigation). That “level should be achieved within
a time-frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to
climate change, to ensure that food production is not threatened and
to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner”
[emphasis added]. Mitigation, adaptation, food security, sustainable
development are still, twenty years on, the key concepts on which the
negotiations turn.
The best-known and probably most important result produced by
the Convention is the Kyoto Protocol of 11 December 1997, which first
set objectives for the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions for 37
industrial countries and for the European Community as a whole. The
reduction – an average of 5 per cent with respect to 1990 – must be
achieved in the period between 2008 and 2012. The binding nature of
these objectives is certainly the distinctive feature of the agreement.
Another highly significant feature, still today, is the principle of
“common but differentiated responsibilities”, under which most of the
burden of emission reduction should be placed upon the developed
countries, since the present stock of human-originated greenhouse
gases in the atmosphere came essentially from activities in those
countries starting with the industrial revolution.
The Kyoto Protocol accordingly expires at the end of 2012, 
and the discussion has long been under way on the proper design of
the successor agreement for the “post-Kyoto” period. Certainly the
most widely publicized phase in these talks was the Conference 
of the Parties (COP-15) in Copenhagen in December 2009. 
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4 Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, EU, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan,
South Korea, Mexico, Russia, South Africa, United Kingdom, United States. 
The successor gathering (COP-16) is in Cancun, Mexico, in
December 2010.
2. Global policies, local policies
Why is the UN the negotiating forum on climate change?
The standard answer is that climate change is a global problem,
caused by greenhouse gases that move through the atmosphere,
without regard for national boundaries. Any solution that is not global
will not be effective. Yet while the gases do circulate freely, their
emissions are highly concentrated both geographically and sectorally.
Geographically, China and the United States alone account for
over 40 per cent of emissions of carbon dioxide, the most common
greenhouse gas. India accounts for 5.2 per cent, the European Union
14.7 per cent, Russia 5.5 per cent (Table 1, in the Appendix). So a plan
involving even just the top seven emitting countries, the so-called E-7
(considering the EU, improperly, as a country) would cover over 73
per cent of CO2 emissions – a critical mass that would contribute
significantly to resolving the problem.
The Bush Administration sought to bring the “major emitters”
together in an informal discussion forum, separate from the UN,
precisely in view of this concentration. With the Obama
Administration this was transformed into the “Major Economies
Forum” grouping the largest 17 economies in terms of GDP, which
account for over 80 per cent of emissions.4 This effort could ultimately
mean turning to a negotiating forum, such as the G20, that has nothing
to do with the United Nations.
It is clear that national or regional policies, however ambitious, can
never, as such, have a significant impact on the process. Important
though it is, for instance, the European Union’s pledge to cut
emissions by 20 per cent from their 1990 levels, adopted politically in
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5 For more on this approach, see R. Baron, B. Buchner and J. Ellis (2009), “Sectoral
Approaches and the Carbon Market” (IEA/OECD).
6 G.J.M.Phylipsen, J.W. Bode, K. Blok, H. Merkus and B. Metz (1998), “A Triptych sectoral
approach to burden differentiation: GHG emissions in the European bubble – Negotiating
Targets”, Energy Policy 26/12.
2007 and formally in 2009, will have limited effects on a global scale,
because the EU does not count for even 15 per cent of total emissions.
Accordingly, we can describe the EU’s position over these three years
as an effort, through the imposition of very ambitious emission
reduction targets, to assume the leadership of the global climate
change negotiations. Unfortunately, this attempt has been
unsuccessful, to judge by the Union’s relative lack of bargaining power
at Copenhagen.
Sectorally, the data on the major economies supplied by the OECD
and the International Energy Agency in 2007 show an enormous
concentration of emissions in electricity generation and heating, while
industry and transport have smaller and more or less equal shares
(Table 2). This concentration, together with the recognized difficulty
in devising globally agreed solutions for climate change, has
persuaded some observers that a new negotiating strategy is needed.
That is, the approach must be by sector, not by country. Emissions-
reduction accords should involve only a few energy-intensive
industries, such as cement, steel and electricity generation.5
3. Kyoto and Europe
When it signed the Kyoto Protocol, the European Union had
fifteen member states; the commitment was to cut emissions by 8 per
cent from their 1990 level by 2012. This collective engagement was
then “translated” into legally binding quotas for member states (Table
3), based on the “triptych approach”.6 This consists in a series of
hypotheses and scenarios of emission reduction in three major sectors
– electricity generation, energy-intensive export industries, and the
rest of the economy – that can achieve the national targets. As the
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7 There is also provision for joint implementation of reductions in countries subject to
the obligation.
authors see it, these objectives should consider the reduction potential
of each sector (and, aggregating them, of each country) and also the
capacity to finance the investment required. Known as “burden
sharing,” this problem is far from having been resolved. Not even the
so-called “20-20-20” package can be considered truly satisfactory,
either as to emissions or as to renewable sources.
In 2000 the European Commission launched a programme to
devise an overall policy to reduce emissions within the Union. The
main pillar of this European Climate Change Programme is an
Emission Trading Scheme (ETS), instituted by Directive 2003/87/EC,
designed to “promote reductions of greenhouse gas emissions” in
energy-intensive industries and electricity generation, which together
account for 50 per cent of all European greenhouse gas emissions, “in
a cost-effective and economically efficient manner” (Article 1). Under
the Scheme, firms can comply with their reduction obligations either
by installing more efficient technology or by purchasing emission
allowances from firms that are in surplus. Firms violating the limits set
in the national allocation plans will be subject to substantial fines 
(€100 per tonne of carbon dioxide).
The ETS also allows for the possibility, as Kyoto provides, of
investing in emission reduction in countries that are not subject to the
reduction requirement and using the resulting credits towards one’s
own obligations. This “clean development mechanism” is intended to
foster the transfer of “clean” technology to developing and emerging
countries.7
Other policies promoted by the European Climate Change
Programme, from the outset, involve energy efficiency of buildings (70
per cent of the energy consumed by European households goes for
heating and another 14 per cent for hot water) and of automobiles as
well as renewable energy sources (a directive set national targets for
the production of electricity from renewable sources by 2010).
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In October 2005 the Programme’s second phase was launched,
with more ambitious reduction targets for the transport sector. The first
objective was to include aviation in the ETS starting in 2013, the
second to introduce binding reduction targets for automobile makers.
The regulation on cars was proposed in December 2007; in view of its
importance in cutting emissions in the non-ETS sector, and obviously
given the importance of motor vehicles to Italian manufacturing
generally, Italy immediately considered this as an integral part of the
“20-20-20” package.
4. The “20-20-20” package
With two communications issued 7 January 2007,8 the Commission
started the talks towards a new phase in EU energy and climate
policy, much more ambitious in its objectives and scope. Both energy
and climate policies are needed to attain the overall objective of
holding global warming to 2 degrees C. by comparison with the pre-
industrial age. 
The main components of energy policy are:
- security of supplies;
- enhanced functioning of the market and better regulation;
- improving energy efficiency;
- greater use of renewable energy sources;
- investment in new technology, including carbon capture and storage.
On climate, the main points are:
- reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, in part through energy
policy (renewable sources, efficiency, capture and storage);
- reinforcing ETS;
- greater stress on the contribution of the transport sector;
- significant investment in R&D, as in the energy sector.
The Italian position in the energy and climate change negotiations
8 European Commission Communication (2007), “An energy policy for Europe” COM
(2007) 1; “Limiting global climate change to 2 degrees Celsius: The way ahead for 2020
and beyond” COM (2007) 2.
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Perhaps the most signif icant innovation of these
communications is the call for binding, and highly ambitious,
numerical objectives not only for emissions but also for renewable
energy, including biofuels, and subjecting them to the deadline of
2020. The Commission calls for cutting greenhouse gas emissions by
20 per cent from their 1990 level; and if a global accord, to go into
effect with the lapse of Kyoto, is reached, raising this to 30 per cent.
The reduction should come both in ETS and in non-ETS sectors,
such as construction and transport. The Commission further calls for
raising the share of total energy from renewable sources to 20 per
cent, with binding national targets, including a specific target of 10
per cent for biofuels. These three numerical objectives clearly
characterized the overall plan, which has become known simply as
the “20-20-20” package.
Finally, there is also a fourth “20” – the increase in energy
efficiency, but the target here is merely recommended. The
discussions now under way on the possibility or necessity of
making it binding should be concluded by February 2011 at a
special European Council on energy. Here too, it is worth noting,
the problem of burden sharing will not be readily resolved. First of
all, just devising a single, shared, measurable definition of efficiency
is no easy matter. And second, account has to be taken of past
efforts and accomplishments. For instance, Italy has a highly
efficient generating system and low energy intensity of GDP.
Objectives that ignored these facts would carry very high marginal
costs.
The Commission’s proposal was adopted by the Council on 8
March 2007.9 The heads of state and government accepted both the
general proposals and the numerical targets, asking the Commission
to draft legislation to implement them. This initiated the pre-
negotiation phase, during which governments generally try to
influence the legislation before it is presented.
9 http://registere.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/07/st07/st07224-re01.en07.pdf.
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5. Determining Italy’s position and coordinating the negotiating
stance
The strategic importance of the energy-climate package was self-
evident from the start; equally self-evident was that if Italy was to
have some impact on the negotiations, there would have to be a
single position, strict coordination between all the relevant ministries:
environment, economic development, economy and finance,
research, infrastructures, transport, all closely involved with the
package and its implementation; and also, of course, the foreign
ministry. Different sensibilities on key issues could have resulted in
divergent positions in Brussels, damaging if not completely vitiating
Italy’s influence.
Accordingly, in January 2007 the Department for European Affairs
in the Prime Minister’s Office, started a coordination process. As a
“neutral,” the Department was well placed to help forge a united
Italian position, maintained more effectively in the various negotiating
forums. The climate-energy package was the first instance of effective,
continuing use of the Interministerial Committee for European Affairs
(CIACE), whose Secretariat is in fact under the Department.
In hindsight, this was a good choice, for two reasons. First, many
of the Italian negotiating proposals produced by coordination were in
fact adopted in the final version of the draft legislation. And second,
possibly less evident to the public, that coordination exercise, which
continues today in relation to the implementation of the package,
helped to create a climate of trust, cooperation and information
exchange among ministries and their representatives. This constituted
a highly significant change with respect to Italy’s traditional conduct
in negotiations.
In addition to cooperation among ministries, let us mention the
good, cooperative relations with the other stakeholders that were
forged during the negotiations, and that continue today. Dialogue
with corporate experts, in fact, is important in determining the
national interest. In some cases that dialogue was indispensable to
quantify the impact of the proposed European legislation on Italian
The Italian position in the energy and climate change negotiations
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10 European Parliament and Council Regulat ion setting emission performance requirements
for new cars as part of the integrated Community approach to reduce CO2 emissions by
light vehicles.
firms. In others, the firms themselves provided invaluable analysis
based on data in the public domain.
6. The package
The Commission presented its final proposals behind schedule, on
23 January 2008 instead of September 2007, reflecting the pressures to
which it was subject as well as the complexity of the task. The
package contained the following:
• Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive
amending Directive 2003/87/EC to improve and extend the
Community’s emission trading scheme;
• Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Decision on the
actions of Member States to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in
sectors not covered by the ETS directive;
• Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive on the
geological storage of carbon dioxide and amending Council
Directives 85/337/EEC and 96/61/EC and Directives 2000/60/EC,
2001/80/EC, 2004/35/EC, 2006/12/EC and Regulation 1013/2006/EC;
• Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive on
promoting the use of energy from renewal sources.
In December 2007 a proposal for a regulation for the reduction of
automobile emissions was also presented.10
The first four proposals form what has come to be called the
“energy-climate package.” However, in view of the substantial
incidence of transport in overall emissions, and given the obvious
importance of motor vehicles in Italian manufacturing, Italy
considered the provision on automobiles as an integral part of the
package and made it clear that failure to reach an agreement on cars
would jeopardize the entire agreement.
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11 Guidelines for the proceedings referred to in Article 12 of  Legislative Decree 387 of
29 December 2003 for the authorization of the construction and operation of plants for
the production of electricity from renewable sources and technical guidelines for the
plants themselves.
7. The position on renewables
The period between the European Council in March 2007 and the
Commission’s presentation of its legislative proposals in January 2008
was one of intense “pre-negotiation” by all the member states to get
their special national characteristics taken into account. One of the first
problems Italy faced was the national renewable energy target. Italy
presented a position paper to the Commission in September. Burden
sharing of the overall objective of 20 per cent was fraught with
difficulty. There are major differences between countries in incentive
programmes for renewables and in authorization procedures, which in
Italy involve local intervention by a number of different administrative
levels (the recent approval of Guidelines should mitigate this
problem11). Further, incentives are financed through electricity
customers’ bills, which means that in Italy, where the average cost of
electricity is about 30 per cent above the European average, an
increase in production from renewables can have a significant effect
on that cost.
In addition, renewable energy output depends heavily, other
factors given, on the features of the territory. The number of hours of
sunshine or wind obviously has a direct impact on the output of solar
and wind plants. Thus the same technology will produce different
yields depending on where it is installed. For biofuels, a sharp rise in
demand could have adverse effects in terms of competition with food
production or, in the case of imports, the sustainable use of forests.
Finally, the NIMBY (Not In My Backyard) syndrome can never be
neglected.
This highly concise and inevitably imprecise list is enough to give
an idea of the scale and type of problems. The first objective was
The Italian position in the energy and climate change negotiations
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accordingly to determine the theoretical maximum potential output of
renewable energy in Italy given the characteristics of the country.
“Theoretical” entailed the hypothesis of no administrative/bureaucratic
obstacles, no NIMBY resistance, and no effect on the cost of electricity.
The Italian government’s position paper “Energy: Issues and
challenges for Europe and for Italy” (2007) estimated that theoretical
maximum in 2020 at about three times the estimated output in 2005 –
a rise from 6.71 to 20.97 MTOE (million tons of oil equivalent); the
potential electricity output was estimated as more than doubling,  from
4.29 to 8.96 MTOE, including a more than 10-fold increase in wind
power and a 300-fold increase in photovoltaic power (Table 4).
The potential from geothermal, solar and biomass was estimated at
11.40 MTOE, with substantial increments in new-generation
geothermal (fourfold), thermal solar (36-fold), and biomass (fivefold).
Overall, the increment in this sector was projected at over fivefold,
compared with the 2005 output of 2.12 MTOE. For biofuels, finally, the
paper estimated a possible doubling of national output, which would
have Italy still far below the binding objective of satisfying 10 per cent
of the overall fuel requirement by biofuels. So imports would be
necessary.
Overall, considering the scenario’s preliminary estimates for
consumption and efficiency in 2020, Italy’s production of renewable
energy would come to about 15 per cent of the total. In terms of final
domestic consumption, which is the relevant factor for the objective,
Italy would be at 14 and not 20 per cent.
The position that Italy presented to the Commission, therefore, was
that the national objectives should be calculated on the basis of
national potential. Full realization of potential – the actual
dissemination of renewable technologies – depends on a set of
political, institutional, economic and technological factors. Setting
national objectives above the potential, it was argued, would create a
risk of unsustainable policies, in terms of higher energy costs, but
would not make attainment of the objective any more credible. There
would be a risk of failure in the overall aim of increasing renewables.
However, the Commission – at a meeting at the Italian seat of
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12 http://www.sviluppoeconomico.gov.it/pdf_upload/documenti/allegatodoc_prev2.pdf.
government attended by the energy commissioner Andris Piebalgs and
the environment commissioner Stavros Dimas – made it clear that
adopting the standard of potential would shift too much of the burden
onto the new members, which lacked the resources. The intention was
therefore to proceed in another manner. Eventually a “mixed”
standard was adopted. The EU was 11 percentage points away from
the 20 per cent objective. The data put the overall level at 8.5 per cent
in 2005. So the Commission proposed to require a 5.5-point increase
in any case, while allotting the rest of the improvement according to
per capita GDP, reflecting investment capacity.
This would assign Italy an objective surpassing its potential, which
subsequent calculations put at 17 per cent. It was therefore necessary
to find some mechanism for flexibility that the European institutions
would agree to and that would make it possible to go beyond
potential. The mechanism devised – proposed by Italy alone and
included in the final text of the Directive – was provision for trading in
renewable energy not only within the EU but also with non-members.
This would make it easier to attain the objectives while permitting
development and adoption of the new technologies where the
potential is greatest, thus where their use is most cost-effective. Italy’s
natural partners, geographically, are the Balkan countries for
hydroelectric power and North Africa for solar power. The first
planning document mentioned joint projects with Montenegro,
Albania and Tunisia, but also with Switzerland.12
The spread of renewables in non-EU countries will have significant
effects towards the reduction objective and will make its attainment
more sustainable. According to the 2010 Renewable Energy Action
Plan template, Italy should make substantial use of the mechanisms of
cooperation provided for in the Directive. Italy has the largest
estimated “deficit” in domestic electricity generation from renewables.
In 2020 Italy expects to import 1.1 MTOE in various forms (electricity
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imports, joint projects with other EU countries and with non-EU
countries, statistical transfers). To this end, by virtue of the possibility
of green certificates for energy produced abroad, a memorandum of
understanding is being drafted with Poland for cooperation on
renewable energy projects. Another agreement (now being revised) is
already in course of implementation with Albania, and one with
Serbia. Italy already imports electricity from Switzerland.
Other significant points in the Italian position paper concerned
incentives, bureaucracy and biofuels. The Member States have widely
divergent incentive programmes, both in type and in amount. The two
main incentives used in Italy are “green certificates” and feed-in tariffs
(called in Italy “conto energia”). The certificates constitute a market
mechanism that allocates to energy producers a certificate for each
renewable megawatt. Combined with a minimum requirement for
output from renewables, the mechanism is based on the balance
between supply and demand for the certificates. Demand comes from
conventional energy producers who are subject to a minimum
renewable energy requirement. Supply comes from renewable energy
producers, who are entitled to certificates attesting to their output. The
system constitutes a market mechanism because price depends on free
bargaining between producers. The certificates are used in Italy to
incentivate all renewables except solar power. They have been
especially successful in prompting the massive growth of wind farms. 
Feed-in tariffs generally serve as an incentive for photovoltaic
production. They offer a fixed feed-in tariff for electricity transmitted
to the grid for the entire investment period. This approach has been
highly successful in Germany and also in Italy. However, there has
been a widespread lowering of the feed-in incentive tariff in recent
years, owing both to technological advances and to the economic
crisis. The sharpest cuts have been in Spain, Germany and France.
Italy too, after protracted negotiations between central and regional
governments, has reached agreement on incentive reform.
Italy’s negotiating point was that national differences in incentive
systems or levels could distort the dissemination of technology, possibly
fostering installation of solar plants in areas where the potential benefits
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are limited. Harmonization of incentives, differentiated by technology
and taking account of its degree of maturity, would be preferable,
preventing market distortions. As a second-best solution, Italy suggested
harmonization of principles, i.e. of the way the incentives work.
Unfortunately, these proposals were not adopted. The situation
remained basically unchanged, with firms free to shop around among
the incentive systems. Some countries, Germany among them, had
fiercely opposed the harmonization of incentive systems, contending
that national systems could create and support a national renewable
energy technology industry (and in effect they did).
Finally, considering its difficult situation, in this matter, Italy
suggested simplifying authorization procedures and reducing the
related bureaucratic costs. It is clear that an increase in renewables on
the scale required by the Directive must be associated with
streamlined administrative procedures and requires full cooperation
with regional and local authorities. This point was fully incorporated
in the Commission’s proposal.
On biofuels, it soon became clear that a binding 10 per cent objective
for all member states presented not only technical but serious political
difficulties. As the EU does not have sufficient biofuel production
potential to reach the objective, at least unrefined biofuel would have to
be imported. So Italy, together with other countries, successfully lobbied
for stringent standards of sustainability – social and economic as well as
environmental – for the imported biofuels. The concern was that land
might be taken out of food crop production in favour of biofuels, driving
up the prices of food commodities in the poorest countries. In addition,
investment should go mainly to second-generation biofuels, which
intrinsically carry less risk of competition with food crops.
Italy has now presented its own Action Plan for attaining its
assigned 17 per cent target. The main numerical targets are given in
Table 5. A full assessment of the Plan is beyond the scope of this
article, but we would like to point out one essential aspect. The Plan
relies partly on non-EU imports to achieve the objective. Yet it is
obvious that where there is an overall EU shortage, the competition to
exploit third-country potential will be fierce. For instance, we can look
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13 BMWi (2010), “Energieszenarien für ein Energiekonzept der Bundesregierung,” at
http://www.bmwi.de/BMWi/Navigation/Service/publikationen,did=356294.html.
at the German Desertec initiative: it is business-driven, to be sure, but
strongly backed by the government for its potential contribution to
attaining the objectives assigned to Germany. This concept is
developed further in the government’s Energiekonzept scenarios,
intended to map out the diffusion of renewables in Germany up to
2050.13 France’s Action Plan on renewables counts explicitly on the
Mediterranean Solar Plan, a broader and more directly government-
sponsored programme, to import renewable energy for resale to
countries that need it to satisfy the requirement.
It is therefore obvious that Italy’s efforts to conclude bilateral
agreements in this field are strategic, even going beyond the spheres
of business and technology. The agreements represent a significant
opportunity for concrete economic cooperation, as in the field of
energy governance. In fact, to exploit those countries’ energy potential
for purposes of compliance with the European directive, a clear
regulatory framework of incentives and certification needs to be
instituted. Obviously, too, action designed solely to gain advantage
with no practical benefit for the local territory could never win the
agreement of local governments. This was most evident in the course
of the talks, first in Cairo and then in Brussels, on the Mediterranean
Solar Plan governance paper and strategy paper.
8. The ETS directive
One critical point for Italy in the directive approved in 2003, was
the burden sharing of the EU emission reduction target. The triptych
approach failed to “capture” the distinctive features of Italian industry,
in particular the low level of emissions in relation to output, which
suggests that energy efficiency is already fairly well advanced.
Essentially, the provision was asking Italy to cut emissions by more
than the technological potential would allow, which could have meant
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a loss of competitiveness, in that Italian firms would sustain greater
compliance costs. Failure to achieve the reductions laid down in the
National Allocation Plans we recall would have brought heavy fines,
on the order of €100 per excess tonne of CO2. 
At its approval, the directive covered 12,000 plants installed at
some 5,000 European firms in energy-intensive industries: production
of basic materials such as iron, steel, paper, glass, cement, bricks, and
coke as well as electricity generation, of course, and oil refining. This
counted for about half of Europe’s CO2 emissions. At the start of each
year, each plant was to be given a certain number of one-tonne
emission certificates. The total volume of certificates issued was to
reflect the plant’s reduction objective. If the firm intended to produce
more emissions than that, it would have to buy additional certificates
in the market. If its performance was better and it did not have to use
all its certificates, it could sell the excess, thus lowering the cost of the
investment needed for emissions-sparing production processes.
The critique – which would inspire some of the amendments to the
package – was directed not only at the distortions introduced by
burden sharing and the resulting National Allocation Plans but also,
indeed chiefly, at the fact that the certificates were to be allocated by
the member states free of charge based on past emissions. The
combination of this “grandfathering” provision with the degree of
discretion allowed member state governments and their intention 
to protect certain industries against excessive costs and loss of
competitiveness resulted, in some countries, in overallocation.
Accordingly, in the 2008 package reforming the ETS directive, the
Commission proposed dropping both the sharing out of the objective
burden among member states and the free allocation of emission
certificates. The new overall reduction objective (21 per cent for ETS
sectors between 2005 and 2020, starting in 2013) no longer took
national characteristics or sectoral differences into account. The ETS
perimeter was extended to include aluminium, chemicals and – the
first application to transport – aviation. Save for the smallest firms, for
which simpler procedures were available – a point on which Italy had
insisted – all firms were required to attain the overall objective, and
The Italian position in the energy and climate change negotiations
Carlo Viviani
248
would have to buy enough certificates for their needs at auction.
Like the original directive, the proposed amendment simply
postulates that the market mechanism is the most efficient way to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions. For this to be so, the price of
carbon dioxide emissions must obviously be high enough to constitute
a significant cost for manufacturers. The problems mentioned, plus
others, however, produced a collapse in CO2  prices, which at the start
of 2008 hit a low of €0.01 a tonne. Grandfathering and overallocation
thus to be avoided, and a significant charge had to be made for
emission certificates. The Commission’s impact assessment found that
the entire reform package, including more ambitious reduction
objectives and the certificate auction, would result in an average CO2
price of €30 a tonne from 2013 to 2020.
This should guarantee that the rule will perform better, but the
problem of industrial competitiveness still had to be solved. As
national targets were dropped, the problem of internal market
distortions deriving from the previous system was resolved. But
introducing the 20 per cent objective altered the terms of the question.
This was a much more ambitious objective than that of the Kyoto
Protocol; even more important, it was unilateral. It was not derived
from international negotiations on world climate management after
2013 and indeed did not take them into account. Whatever emissions
reduction objective the other countries adopted, from the standpoint
both of level and of constrictiveness, the European Union, its member
states and its firms would be subject to the binding 20 per cent target.
The increase in costs that would be sustained to achieve this
objective thus became a significant factor in the competitiveness of
European industry. The impact on competitiveness, in fact, was at the
centre of Italy’s position on the issue.
9. Carbon leakage
Differing commitments on emissions reduction could result in so-
called “carbon leakage”. That is, firms subject to stringent emissions
constraints likely to cause substantial cost increases could decide to
249
transfer production to countries with less stringent limits. CO2
emissions would thus “leak” from the more to the less virtuous
countries. And the relocation of productive activities would also have
social repercussions (owing to the impact on jobs), economic
consequences (altering the productive structure of the countries
involved and thus the international division of labour), and
geopolitical effects (increased dependence on external supply of some
essential products such as those of the energy-intensive sectors).
Italy is particularly interested in the problem of carbon leakage
owing to its still substantial manufacturing base. Although the relative
importance of manufacturing is diminishing, as it is throughout
Europe, is still the third-highest in manufacturing’s percentage of value
added behind Germany and Poland (Table 6.1) and second only to
Germany in total manufacturing value added (Table 6.2).
To see whether carbon leakage would damage Italy significantly in
terms of output and employment, it was necessary first to examine
Eurostat’s data on the energy intensity of the manufacturing sub-
sectors accounting for the greatest numbers of jobs. It turned out that
the energy-intensive and very energy-intensive sectors “captured”
about 50 per cent of all manufacturing jobs in Italy in 2005 (Table 7).
Energy intensity does not automatically become carbon leakage: one
must also consider each sector’s emissions intensity, and thus the
potential cost increases of more severe restrictions.
In addition, the analysis of Italy alone would be merely indicative,
identifying the industries potentially exposed to the problem. The
actual determination of the industries at risk of carbon leakage was to
be performed at European level under the new approach laid down in
the ETS directive, which set European and no longer national
reduction objectives. The Commission proposed exempting firms in
the sectors most exposed to carbon leakage from having to buy
emission permits at auction. Excluding inefficient firms from the
benefits of this, though, would require examination of the
characteristics of production processes, benchmarking emissions
efficiency, and assigning free permits only to firms that were within 10
per cent of the benchmark. 
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Italy agreed to exempt only the more efficient firms, in part
because Italy’s low emissions intensity with respect to GDP is an
indicator that Italian firms are among the most efficient in Europe. It
still remained to set the standards for deeming an industry to be at
risk of carbon leakage. The Commission proposed two variables: the
cost increase due to applying the directive (gauged by the forecast
price of CO2) and the relative exposure to international competition
(gauged by trade flows). The results would be supplemented by a
qualitative assessment based, for instance, on the characteristics of
the market.
The problem was setting the leakage risk thresholds. The
Commission’s original position was quite restrictive, for fear of
compromising the environmental integrity of the measure. Italy
maintained that proper consideration needed to be taken of all the risk
factors, not just the environmental ones. Simulations of the sectoral
impacts of various thresholds were run, and Italy based its proposals
on these results (Table 8).
Italy succeeded in winning the inclusion of practically all the
country’s major energy-intensive industries except brick-making. A
sector was to be deemed at risk of carbon leakage if the sum of the
direct and indirect extra costs of application would result in an
overall increase in production costs of more than 5 per cent of gross
value added and if total imports plus exports (by value) exceeded 10
per cent of total sales. And as the negotiations neared their
conclusion, thanks to Italy’s contribution in December 2008 the
European Council established that regardless of these standards, if a
sector had either an exposure to competition or a cost increase of
more than 30 per cent it would be deemed at risk, even if the other
parameter was below its established threshold. This meant the
inclusion, in the subsequent negotiations under the comitology
procedures in 2009, of such sectors as cement production, subject to
low cost increase but strong international competition. Electricity
generation remained outside, on the assumption that it would pass
the cost increase from auction purchases through to prices and that
in any case the price of electricity should incorporate that of CO2.
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14 See http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/emission/auctioning_en.htm for a summary
of the responses to the consultation.
Italy tried but failed to obtain the gradual phasing in of auctions in
electricity generation, citing evidence of relatively little pass-through
and above all the much higher cost of electricity in Italy than in the
rest of Europe. Italy argued that the immediate application of the
auction mechanism, with no period of transition, could have resulted
in a further increase in prices and a loss of competitiveness for
energy-intensive firms.
However, at Germany’s proposal a provision was included
allowing member states to derogate from the rules against state aid
and compensate energy-intensive industries in order to attenuate the
impact of higher electricity costs (indirect carbon leakage) – even
though, Italy noted, this could create distortions owing to the differing
financial capacity of different governments. In Italy’s view, the gradual
introduction of the emission auctions was preferable. The problem
apparently looming in December 2008 was soon overshadowed by the
outbreak of the recession and the aggravation of budget deficits. The
Commission, in fact, has yet to present a concrete proposal on indirect
carbon leakage.
10. The regulation on emission rights auctions
On 3 June 2009, two days before the publication of the “new”
ETS directive in the Official Gazette of the European Union, the
Commission began a consultation on the organization and conduct
of emission rights auctions.14 The consultation lasted two months and
marked the beginning of negotiations that ended on 14 July 2010
with the Climate Change Committee’s approval of a draft regulation.
Under the comitology rules, this was scrutinized for three months by
the Council and the Parliament. As we write, the formal adoption of
the regulation, without amendments, is expected at the end of
October. 
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As noted, auctions will begin in 2013, progressively supplanting
the no-cost allocations. Considering that the electricity industry will
begin with 100 per cent of its emissions rights at auction immediately,
that the ten members joining the EU at the latest enlargement will be
excepted, and that a part of the rights will be allocated free of charge
under the rules on carbon leakage and benchmarking, expectations
are that about a billion rights a year will be auctioned, or half the total.
Even with all the exceptions, at the current CO2 price of €15 a
tonne, this means government budget revenues totalling €15 billion a
year. Governments are accordingly taking a great interest in this
question, all the more so given the need to end the deficits and reduce
the debt created by the crisis and recession. In Italy, in view of the
strong interest expressed above all by the ministries for economy and
finance, economic development, and environment, the Interministerial
Committee for European Affairs instituted a working group during the
phase of response to the European consultation. The group held a
long series of coordination meetings and produced two position
papers, enabling Italy to play a leading role throughout the
negotiations. 
The first question, raised already during the ETS negotiations, was
who would have title to the auction proceeds and what would be
done with the funds. Traditionally, national budget sovereignty is a
most delicate theme. But while it was decided almost immediately that
the proceeds would go to the member states and not the Union, the
destination of the funds was the subject of discussions protracted for
months. The Commission favoured assigning the proceeds to
measures against climate change, but the national governments, in
consideration of sovereign powers, opposed any sort of earmarking.
Owing in part to pressure from the European Parliament, also in
favour of earmarks, one of the classic compromises of European
politics was reached. The final text of the directive reads: “Member
States shall determine the use of revenues generated from the
auctioning of allowances. At least 50% of the revenues generated from
the auctioning of allowances referred to in paragraph 2, including all
revenues from the auctioning referred to in paragraph 2, points (b)
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15 Reduce greenhouse gas emissions, adapt to the impacts of climate change and fund
research and development and demonstration projects for reducing emissions and for
adaptation to climate change, develop renewable energies to meet the commitment of
the Community to using 20% renewable energies by 2020, help meet the commitment
of the Community to increase energy efficiency by 20% by 2020, environmentally safe
capture and geological storage of CO2, contribute to the Global Energy Efficiency and
Renewable Energy Fund and to the Adaptation Fund as made operational by the Poznan
Conference on Climate Change (COP 14 and COP/MOP 4), measures to avoid
deforestation and increase afforestation and reforestation in developing countries that
have ratified the international agreement on climate change, to transfer technologies and
to facilitate adaptation to the adverse effects of climate change in these countries, and
to address social aspects such as the potential impact of higher electricity prices on lower
and middle income households.
16 Curiously, the Italian version of the directive inaccurately reads “è usato” [shall be used]
instead of “dovrebbe essere usato” [should be used].
and (c), or the equivalent in financial value of these revenues, should
be used for one or more of the following: […].”15 What got the talks
unblocked was the use of “should”16 – governments were assured
there would be no automatic allocation, while the Parliament and the
Commission could count on substantial political pressure on those
governments to allocate a significant part to “green” projects.
Emission permits for 2013-2020 are assigned to member states by a
set of standards; 88 per cent are assigned according to emissions in 2005-
2007; 10 per cent go to the poorer members in consideration of their
lower per capita GDP and their accordingly greater prospects for growth
and hence higher emissions (this gave Italy an additional 2 per cent of
permits). Finally, the last 2 per cent were given to the nine new members
that in 2005 had achieved a 20 per cent reduction in greenhouse gas
emissions with respect to 1990 (essentially, those in eastern Europe).
The key question in the talks was the choice between a harmonized,
centralized auction and a coordinated system based on various
platforms. From the outset Italy backed the central system that the
Commission proposed, allowing for better control of liquidity and
minimizing price volatility, the two problems that had plagued the first
two phases of ETS (2005-08 and 2008-12). As the Italian position paper
sent to the Commission on 25 November 2009 had noted, “A centralised
The Italian position in the energy and climate change negotiations
Carlo Viviani
254
17 “Italian position on EU Emission Allowances Auctions (ETS)”, 25 November 2009.
18 To be precise, under comitology the blocking minority typical of voting in the Council
does not block the adoption of the legislative proposal. In the event of a lack of a majority
or of a vote against in committee, the Commission must in any case submit a proposal
to the Council and the Parliament, which can be rejected only by a qualified majority.
However, the Commission always seeks the broadest possible agreement on a decision
that is ultimately its own, possibly with the assistance of a committee (here, the Climate
Change Committee). This explains the concessions that the final text made to the various
member states. 
system seems to be the most efficient since it would i) create a truly
European market; ii) guarantee the formation of a unique price for a
homogenous good; iii) minimize arbitrage-seeking efforts that might
arise if multiple auctions were to take place in different Member States;
iv) avoid the duplication of fixed costs for setting up different auction
platforms; v) guarantee the access of all ETS operators to the
allowances.”17
In the response to the consultation many firms, especially in the
electricity industry (the one most directly affected by the first phase of
application of the auction system) favoured the central system. Most
governments concurred as well, but the United Kingdom, Spain,
Poland and Germany were against it from the start, though not all for
the same reasons, and formed a blocking minority.18
A compromise had to be found that would not undermine the
integrity of the centralized system but would address the four
governments’ concerns. The only possibility, though many countries
including Italy were against it, was an opt-out clause, albeit subject to
quite stringent constraints, such as the requirement that national auction
platforms had to be approved by the Climate Change Committee,
consistency of local rules with the Regulation on auctions, and close
coordination between national and central platforms – for example,
such that the central calendar has preference over national ones.
The second crucial point in the Italian position was its special
attention to SMEs. The ETS directive itself already called for adequate
protection for these firms, but the fear of excessive “financialization”
of the system, which would penalize small businesses, led the
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19 http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/10/338&type=HTMI.
20 See the website of Eurelectric, the sectoral trade association, at:
http://www2.eurelectric.org/content/Default.asp?PageID=959.
government to ask to simplify the system by using spot rather than
futures auctions. And in order to minimize access barriers and costs for
SMEs, Italy asked that they be allowed to participate on a pooled basis,
possibly through trade associations. Both these requests were granted,
and in commenting on the approval of the Regulation the Commission
specifically mentioned the need for simplicity in explaining the choice
of the spot auction technique. It was also made clear that the
allowances would not be treated as financial products.19
Finally, Italy supported the request of European electricity
companies to move up to 2011-12 the auction of the allowances for
2013, to satisfy a forward hedging requirement estimated at 1.2-1.4
billion certificates by the end of that year.20 In addition to averting
excessive pressure on electricity prices, the early auctioning of part of
the allowances provided for in the final version of the regulation
enabled Italy to use a part of the proceeds to solve its problem of
insufficient “new entrant reserves” up to 2013.
Many of the other, more technical aspects of the regulation are
probably not relevant here. But we should like to underscore one
essential point from the political standpoint. Namely, that the great
complexity of the matter, perhaps not fully explicated in our account
here, required extremely close cooperation, much more than normal,
between the Commission and the member state governments. This
cooperation produced a balanced result that overcame most of the
members’ concerns. We can only hope that this serves as an example
for other, equally complicated questions.
11. The non-ETS sectors
The EU splits the overall objective of cutting greenhouse gas
emissions by 20 per cent with respect to 1990 into two macro-sectors:
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ETS and non-ETS. The ETS sectors are to cut emissions by 21 per cent
and the non-ETS by 10 per cent with respect to 2005 (for the sake of
homogeneous data for all member states). The sum comes to 14 per
cent, which is equivalent to 20 per cent vis-à-vis 1990.
National plans and targets have been dropped for the ETS sectors,
but this was impossible for the non-ETS, owing to their diversity and
the consequent difficulty of devising harmonized policies for all
sectors (with some major exceptions). The main non-ETS sectors are
transport, buildings, services, non-energy-intensive manufacturing,
agriculture, and waste treatment. The non-ETS sectors overall account
for about half of all European greenhouse gas emissions. 
Here again, therefore, the problem of burden sharing for the EU
objective of 10 per cent arose. From the start Italy argued that the
burden should be shared according to a country’s real potential for
reduction. Objectives should be set by standards of cost effectiveness,
which means taking country characteristics into account. Italy
proposed the standard of per capita emissions, which was
unfortunately rejected in favour of per capita GDP. Italy stressed that
this would not properly share the burden, as it measured only a
country’s ability to pay, not its potential emission reduction. The idea
of a linear combination of the two indicators, which would have at
least partially incorporated the principle of potential and thus
attenuated the distortions, was also rejected (Table 9). As with the
objective on renewables, the standard adopted will avoid placing a
greater burden on the new members, which in fact are entitled to
increases rather than reductions of non-ETS emissions. Countries like
Italy are required to make greater than potential reductions, entailing
greater costs.
The other important question was intermediate objectives. While
Italy succeeded in making them merely indicative on renewables, on
emissions the Commission proposed to make them binding. Our main,
unheeded objection was that binding targets would force measures
with immediate effect, regardless of long-run efficacy, and encourage
the purchase of emission rights internationally even where there was
no real risk of not achieving the final objective. Further, the system of
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21 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/App/NewsRoom/loadDocument.aspx?id=353&lang=
EN&directory=en/intm/&fileName=94184.pdf. 
The documentation on CARS 21 is at:
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/automotive/competitiveness-cars21/cars21/.
constant annual reductions took no account of sectoral differences or
possible changes in weather or economic conditions and was
accordingly unrealistic. At least we did obtain somewhat greater
flexibility, the possibility of deferring attainment of the objectives by a
year and of “exchanging” overfulfilments with other countries.
12. Reduction of automobile emissions
The overall reduction commitment necessarily implies a significant
cut in motor vehicle emissions. Road transport is the second greatest
source of greenhouse gas emissions in the European Union and is the
prime exception to the non-harmonized approach to non-ETS
emissions. European automakers had already underwritten 
a voluntary pledge to cut emissions below 140 grams per
vehicle/kilometer by 2008. Observing that most producers had failed
to honour this pledge, the Commission launched a consultation with
stakeholders for an “integrated approach,” i.e. a combination of
competitiveness and industrial policy with environmental
considerations, as the EU Competitiveness Council underscored in its
conclusions of May 200721:
“23. [The Council] SUPPORTS an integrated approach as proposed by
the Commission, for reducing CO2 emissions from motor vehicles;
UNDERLINES that all the players must make their contribution to
reducing emissions harmful to the climate and UNDERLINES the
opportunity for a regulatory framework which is cost-effective,
ensures affordable mobility and contributes to preserving the
global competitiveness of the automotive industry;
“24. CALLS ON the Commission to configure the planned framework
for attaining the target for average CO2 emissions from the fleet
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of new cars sold in the EU on the basis of a thorough impact
assessment in a way that is as neutral as possible from the point
of view of competition, and which is socially equitable and
sustainable. It should be framed in such a way as to ensure that
all manufacturers continue efforts to make their whole vehicle
production more environmentally friendly in a cost-effective
way; […]
“26. CALLS on the Commission, in concert with the Member States and
the stakeholders, to implement the measures identified in the
CARS 21 Communication in order to give predictability and
planning certainty to the automotive industry, which is necessary
because of its long lead times”.
These three conclusions – especially no. 24 – are representative of
the discussion carried on for nearly two years. For instance,
competitive neutrality meant making sure that any given
manufacturer’s characteristics did not constitute an advantage in
attaining the objectives. Social sustainability implied avoiding
excessive cost increases for smaller cars: many emissions-reduction
technologies, in fact, have high fixed costs, which would have
proportionally greater incidence on less costly cars and could
therefore penalize the mobility of lower-income persons, as well as
distorting competition when – as is the case – manufacturers specialize
in different market segments.
On 19 December 2007 the Commission presented a proposal for a
regulation setting binding emission reduction  targets for cars,
differentiated by manufacturer. The proposal embodied the
Competitiveness Council’s recommendation only in part. It requires
manufacturers to comply with an average European ceiling of 
130 grams of CO2 per kilometer by 2012, while also citing
“complementary” measures with demonstrated impact on fuel
consumption and hence on emissions (such as tyre pressure, air
conditioning, speed control devices) that could bring emissions down
to 120 g/km. 
The regulation differentiates manufacturers’ objectives, basing
burden sharing on vehicle weight and making attainment of the
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22 For more details, see Institute for European Environmental Policy (2007), “Possible
regulatory approaches to reducing CO2 emissions from cars – Final Report and Technical
notes,” the study on which the Commission’s own proposal was based; and European
Commission (2007), “Proposal from the Commission to the European Parliament and
Council for a Regulation to reduce CO2 emissions from passenger cars – Impact
Assessment.” For the entire documentation, available online, see:
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/air/transport/co2/co2_home.htm. 
objective less burdensome as the average weight of the cars sold
increases.22 Compliance with these limits was to be ensured by severe
sanctions to be phased in, reaching a fine of €95 per g/km over the
target in 2015. The sanction was to be applied to all the vehicles sold
by a maker, not just those failing to reach the objective. Independent
car makers producing fewer than 10,000 cars a year would be
exempted, in the sense that they could negotiate specific targets of
their own.
This approach, which favoured producers of heavier cars, was
objectively harmful to FIAT, whose fleet was lighter than average
with lower emissions. The marginal cost of further reductions, per
gram, would have been greater for the manufacturers that began
from lower emission levels. But it was clear from the outset that
the Commission had no intention of abandoning this standard, so
it was necessary to find other components of the regulation
making it less problematic for our motor vehicle industry. The key
was to reach an agreement among the four main car-making
countries: Italy, Germany, France and Britain. After months of
talks, an agreement was concluded on modulated sanctions, the
phasing-in of the regulation, the possibility of counting “eco-
innovations” and “supercredits”, and a better specification of the
special rules for small producers, the previous version of which
had excluded Ferrari and Maserati. The Commission and the
Parliament, less sensitive to the needs of the industry, were then
“forced” to accept the content of the agreement, as the four
countries formed a blocking minority, threatening the outright
failure of the talks.
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The system of sanctions that was adopted derives from an Italian
idea. A “corridor” above each producer’s objective is established
between 2012 and 2019, with sanctions reduced to €5 for an
overshoot of 1 gram, €15 for 2 grams and €25 for 3 grams; the full
sanction of €95 applies to any additional grams of CO2 emissions. This
provides an added incentive to attain the objective while not
excessively penalizing manufacturers that come reasonably close.
Further incentives for innovation are the “supercredit” (via multipliers)
for cars with emissions below 50 g/km and the possibility of counting
up to 7 grams of CO2 (against the average for the entire product line)
for reductions through eco-innovations. 
The regulation will be phased in, applying to 65 per cent of the
cars produced in 2012, 75 per cent in 2013, 80 per cent in 2014 and
100 per cent in 2015. There is also a long-term target of 95 g/km by
2020. The procedures for meeting this requirement (including the
burden-sharing curve) will be laid down following a review conducted
by the Commission before the end of 2012.
Our experience with the negotiations on cars proved invaluable
when the Commission announced its intention to propose a similar
regulation on light commercial vehicles (vans). Italy took the initiative
in writing a joint letter to the environmental commissioner signed by
the permanent representatives of Italy, France, and Germany. The
letter was sent even before the Commission presented its proposal and
resulted in substantive modifications.
13. Drawing the balance: Rubik’s cube
European climate and energy policy has three strategic objectives:
controlling climate change, making energy supplies more secure, and
reducing energy costs. The challenge is to attain all three objectives at
once – that is, to make sure that the tools for achieving one do not
undo the others. We might liken the situation to the famous “Rubik’s
cube” of the 1980s: it is easy enough to solve any one face of the cube,
but this does not bring the overall solution. The right strategy is to
solve all six faces simultaneously.
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23 Council of the European Union, “Energy/Climate Change: Elements of the Final
Compromise”, 11 December 2008.
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/104672.pdf.
A classic example is the Italian electricity generation system. In the
past two decades Italy has invested heavily in its modernization,
converting many plants to natural gas. This has reduced emissions
(natural gas produces less CO2 than other fossil fuels, such as coal) and
improved efficiency (in 2008, according to the International Energy
Agency, Italy had the most efficient generating system in the world). But
the other side of the coin is higher electricity costs, about 30 per cent
above the EU average, owing to the fact that gas prices track oil prices.
And energy security has decreased, since we depend almost entirely on
three countries for primary energy: Algeria, Libya and Russia.
In the negotiations for the 20-20-20 package, Italy aimed at
achieving a balance among the three components of the European
strategy, seeking to reconcile environmental and industrial needs, as in
the effort to prevent differing emissions-reduction requirements from
resulting in competitive distortions (carbon leakage). This meant
making any additional reduction commitment explicitly conditional on
clear, comparable and verifiable targets by third countries.
At the same time we insisted on elements of flexibility where
choices were not determined by cost-effectiveness. One such area was
trade in renewables; another was the non-ETS sectors, or the
possibility under the Kyoto Protocol of making and counting “green”
investment in other countries.
Italy’s negotiating strategy during the two years between the first
communications and the European Council of December 2008 that
brought out the final agreement,23 and in the years following as the
package is implemented, has brought positive results. It has restored
balance, offsetting some features that threatened serious harm to the
country. 
Space considerations prevent us from going into many other
matters. At least two, however, warrant mention. The key to achieving
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24 Richard Ingham (2010) “No quick fix on warming, says new UN climate chief”, Agence
France Presse, (AFP), 9 June 2010.
the ambitious objectives that we have set ourselves in Europe – and
that we hope will also be adopted at global level – is technology. In
Italy and in other European countries with comparable characteristics,
part of the debate turned on the possible industrial spillovers – and the
Commission now sees “green” development as one fundamental aspect
of European economic growth. Technological progress on renewables,
for instance, has already lowered their costs sharply, if not enough to
make them fully competitive with fossil fuels. But significant advances
in such still highly uncertain areas as carbon capture and storage
require huge high-risk investments that might not pay off.
In addition to the package, the Commission also presented its
Strategic Energy Technology Action Plan, with a roadmap for all
energy technologies. Part of the ETS “new entrant reserves” (300
million credits) will be sold to fund innovative projects in renewable
energy and capture and storage. But there is a clear disproportion
between the efforts necessary and the European financial resources
allocated to the new technologies. The risk, which must be averted in
order not to jeopardize policy effectiveness and attainment of the
objectives, is  the “renationalization” first of technology policies and
then of energy policies.
Finally, we must mention the world talks on climate change – the
fundamental backdrop to European policies in this field. Hopes for a
“global and comprehensive agreement” any time soon have faded
considerably following the Copenhagen conference. In one of her first
interviews since succeeding Yvo De Boer at the head of the UNFCCC in
May 2010, Christiana Figueres said: “I don’t believe that we will ever have
a final agreement on climate... in my lifetime. [...] Building the regime is
going to require an effort, a sustained effort of those who will be here,
over the next 20 to 30 to 40 years. [...] We have to understand that this is
an incremental process, this is a gradual process and that whatever we
do is not going to be enough, we still have to hold the bar very high”.24
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towards a global carbon market”, CEPS Special Report.
26 See Gwin Prins et al. (2010), The Hartwell Paper, LSE. Available online at
http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/mackinderProgramme/theHartwellPaper/Default.htm.
We are accordingly very unlikely to see any significant results in
Cancun in 2010, or possibly in South Africa in 2011 either. The
fundamental issue for the global climate change talks, namely the
sharing of sovereign powers, has not yet been faced seriously in
political terms, and some countries, such as China and, in a different
way, the United States, still consider it simply unthinkable to cede or
share their sovereignty on so vital a matter.
People are consequently beginning to wonder whether it may not
be a good idea to find another way of controlling climate change. The
UN-based approach is questioned  because it requires unanimity, and
as we saw at Copenhagen just a handful of countries can prevent the
adoption of a declaration. A possible alternative might be a bottom-up
approach aiming for agreements not between countries but between
industries at global level.25 This would represent a radical change with
very significant geopolitical consequences, and is well worth
studying.26
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TABLE 1. CO2 Emissions, 2006
millions % millions % of world
of tonnes of total of tonnes total
EU countries
China 6103.49 21.1% Germany 880.25 3.0%
United States 5975.10 20.7% United Kingdom 557.86 1.9%
EU-27 4265.58 14.7% Italy 488.04 1.7%
Russia 1577.69 5.5% France 408.69 1.4%
India 1510.35 5.2% Spain 359.63 1.2%
Japan 1273.60 4.4% Poland 330.52 1.1%
Canada 560.39 1.9%
E-7 21266.20 73.5%
South Korea 475.25 1.6%
Mexico 436.15 1.5%
South Africa 414.65 1.4% Iran 466.98 1.6%
Australia 390.44 1.3% Saudi Arabia 381.56 1.3%
Brazil 352.52 1.2% Ukraine 344.53 1.2%
Indonesia 333.48 1.2% Turkey 273.71 0.9%
13 Major Economies * 23668.69 81.8%
World total 28928.26
Source: United Nations, http://unstats.un.org/unsd/ENVIRONMENT/air_co2_emissionshtm. See also
http://unfaccc.int/ghg_data/ghg_data_non_unfccc/items/3170.php.
*E-7 plus S.Korea, Mexico, South Africa, Australia, Brazil, Indonesia.
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TABLE 2. Major Economies, emissions by sector, 2007*
Electricity and heating 45.13%
Industry 19.80%
Transport 19.47%
Residential 6.26%
Other 9.33%
Source: Based on OECD and IEA data: CO2 Emissions from Fuel Combustion, IEA, Paris, 2009; Energy
Balances of OECD Countries, IEA, Paris, 2009; Energy Balances of Non-OECD Countries, IEA, Paris, 2009;
Main Economic Indicators, OECD, Paris, 2009.
*E-7 plus S.Korea, Mexico, South Africa, Australia, Brazil, Indonesia.
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TABLE 3. Sharing of Kyoto targets within EU
EU-15 Member states with individual commitments
Austria -13% Bulgaria -8%
Belgium -7.50% Czech Republic -8%
Denmark -21% Estonia -8%
Finland 0% Hungary -6%
France 0% Latvia -8%
Germany -21% Lithuania -8%
Greece 25% Poland -6%
Ireland 13% Romania -8%
Italy -6.50% Slovakia -8%
Luxembourg -28% Slovenia -8%
Netherlands -6%
Portugal 27%
Spain 15%
Sweden 4%
United Kingdom -12.50%
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TABLE 4. Estimated potential electricity generation 
from renewable sources
State of Total potential 
implementation energy available 
by 2020
31 december 2005
Power Energy Power Energy
(MW) (TWh) (MW) (TWh)
Hydro power plants > 10MW 14,920 28.50 16,000 30.72
Hydro power plants < 10MW 2,405 7.50 4,200 12.43
TOTAL HYDRO SOURCE 17,325 36.00 20,200 43.15
Wind plants on-shore 1,718 2.35 10,000 18.40
Wind plants off-shore 0 0.00 2,000 4.20
TOTAL WIND SOURCE 1,718 2.35 12,000 22.60
Building integrated PV plants 27 0.03 7,500 9.00
Power PV plants 7 0.01 1,000 1.20
Solar thermodynamic 0 0.00 1,000 3.00
TOTAL SOLAR SOURCE 34 0.04 9,500 13.20
Traditional geothermic 711 5.32 1,000 7.48
New generation geothermic 0 0.00 300 2.24
TOTAL GEOTHERMIC SOURCE 711 5.32 1,300 9.73
Plants using biomass coming 
from crops and other 
agro-industry waste 389 2.34 769 5.00
Plants using biodegradable part RSU 527 2.62 800 4.00
Plants using landfill gas. sewage 
treatment plant gas and biogas 285 1.20 492 3.20
Plants using dedicated energy crops 0 0.00 354 2.30
TOTAL BIOMASS. LANDFILL GAS 
AND BIOLOGICAL PURIFICATION 1,201 6.16 2,415 14.50
Wave and tidal energy 0 0.00 800 1.00
TOTAL WAVE AND TIDAL ENERGY 0.00 0.00 800 1.00
TOTAL 20,989 49.87 46,215 104.18
TOTAL PRIMARY ENERGY REPLACED 4.29 MTOE 8.96 MTOE
Source: Governo Italiano (2007) Energy: Issues and challenges for Europe and for Italy. Position paper of
the Italian Government.
Carlo Viviani
270
TA
B
LE
 5
. 
N
at
io
na
l a
ct
io
n 
pl
an
 f
or
 r
en
ew
ab
le
s
G
ro
ss
 f
in
al
 e
ne
rg
y 
co
ns
um
pt
io
n 
an
d 
ta
rg
et
s 
fo
r 
re
ne
w
ab
le
s
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
8
2
0
2
0
Fr
om
G
ro
ss
R
en
ew
ab
le
s/
Fr
om
G
ro
ss
R
en
ew
ab
le
s/
Fr
om
G
ro
ss
R
en
ew
ab
le
s/
re
ne
w
ab
le
fin
al
co
ns
um
pt
io
n
re
ne
w
ab
le
fin
al
co
ns
um
pt
io
n
re
ne
w
ab
le
fin
al
co
ns
um
pt
io
n
so
ur
ce
s
co
ns
um
pt
io
n
so
ur
ce
s
co
ns
um
pt
io
n
so
ur
ce
s
co
ns
um
pt
io
n
[M
TO
E
]
[M
TO
E
]
[%
]
[M
TO
E
]
[M
TO
E
]
[%
]
[M
TO
E
]
[M
TO
E
]
[%
]
E
le
ct
ri
ci
ty
4
.8
4
6
2
9
.7
4
9
1
6
.2
9
%
5
.0
4
3
0
.3
9
9
1
6
.5
8
%
9
.1
1
2
3
1
.4
4
8
2
8
.9
7
%
H
ea
ti
ng
1
.9
1
6
6
8
.5
0
1
2
.8
0
%
3
.2
3
8
5
8
.5
3
4
5
.5
3
%
9
.5
2
6
0
.1
3
5
1
5
.9
3
%
Tr
an
sp
or
t
0
.1
7
9
4
2
.9
7
6
0
.4
2
%
0
.7
2
3
4
2
.6
1
9
1
.7
0
%
2
.5
3
3
9
.6
3
6
.3
8
%
Im
po
rt
s
-
-
-
-
-
-
1
.4
4
-
-
To
ta
l
6
.9
4
1
1
4
1
.2
2
6
4
.9
1
%
9
.0
0
1
1
3
1
.5
5
3
6
.8
4
%
2
2
.3
0
6
1
3
1
.2
1
4
1
7
.0
0
%
Tr
an
sp
or
t 
fo
r 
pu
rp
os
es
 o
f 
1
0
%
 o
bl
ig
.
0
.3
3
8
3
9
0
.8
7
%
0
.9
1
8
3
7
.6
7
0
2
.4
4
%
3
.4
1
9
3
3
.9
7
5
1
0
.0
6
%
S
ou
rc
e:
 M
in
is
tr
o 
de
llo
 S
vi
lu
pp
o 
E
co
no
m
ic
o 
(2
0
1
0
).
 P
ia
no
 d
i a
zi
on
e 
na
zi
on
al
e 
pe
r 
le
 e
ne
rg
ie
 r
in
no
va
bi
li 
– 
S
in
te
si
.
271
The Italian position in the energy and climate change negotiations
TABLE 6.2. Manufacturing value added at base prices
(millions of euros)
EU-27 Germany Spain France Italy Poland UK
2007 1,897.533 518,430 141,295 211,673 262,735 194,763 154,727 
2008 1,851.457 504,220 144,239 208,122 255,501 208,366 150,300 
2009 1,560.189 408,800 124,125 182,558 220,602 200,823 139,889 
Source : Eurostat
TABLE 6.1. Manufacturing industry’s share of value added
EU-27 Germany Spain France Italy Poland UK
1995 20.1 22.6 18.5 14.2 22.2 21.1 21.2
1996 19.7 22.2 18.5 13.7 21.8 19.9 20.6
1997 19.8 22.4 19.0 13.9 21.7 19.8 20.3
1998 19.7 22.7 19.0 14.0 21.7 19.3 19.4
1999 19.6 22.4 18.7 16.1 21.1 19.0 18.4
2000 19.5 22.9 18.6 16.0 21.0 18.5 17.4
2001 18.9 22.8 18.1 15.4 20.4 16.8 16.4
2002 18.3 22.4 17.3 14.7 19.9 16.5 15.3
2003 17.8 22.4 16.8 14.1 19.0 17.7 14.3
2004 17.5 22.6 16.3 13.6 18.8 19.1 13.6
2005 17.3 22.7 15.8 13.2 18.5 18.5 13.3
2006 17.2 23.3 15.5 12.6 18.7 18.8 12.8
2007 17.2 23.8 15.0 12.5 19.0 18.9 12.4
2008 16.6 22.7 14.5 11.9 18.1 18.7 11.6
2009 14.7 19.1 12.7 10.6 16.1 16.9 11.1
Source: Eurostat
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TABLE 8. Assessment of risk of carbon leakage in EU-27 by industry
PRODCOM classification. 2006
Total CO
2
Product Year cost/price ratio (X+M)/
(year average) (P+M)
Cement clinker 2006 0.63 N/A
Quicklime 2006 0.49 0.02
Chlorine 2006 0.35 N/A
Grey portland cement 2006 0.31 0.04
Ammonium nitrate 2006 0.25 0.16
White portland cement 2006 0.23 0.19
Ammonia 2006 0.22 N/A
Ferro-silicon 2006 0.17 0.89
Primary Aluminium 2006 0.17 0.62
Silicon metal 2006 0.17 0.68
Chlorine 2006 0.16 N/A
Hot rolled coil (total) 2006 0.16 0.30
Alumina 2006 0.16 0.74
Primary Aluminium 2006 0.16 0.62
Slabs 2006 0.15 0.54
Hot dipped metallic coated 2006 0.13 0.18
Exfoliated vermiculite, expanded clays, foamed slag 2006 0.13 0.07
and similar expanded mineral materials and mixtures 
thereof
Refractory cements; mortars; concretes and similar 2006 0.12 0.26
compositions (including refractory plastics, ramming 
mixes, gunning mixes) (excluding carbonaceous pastes)
Pulp for newsprint TMP 2006 0.12 0.96
Paper for newsprint TMP 2006 0.09 0.23
Packaging virgin pulp unbleached kraftliner 2006 0.09 0.34
Ferro-silico-manganese 2006 0.09 0.82
Viscose 2006 0.09 0.38
Oxygen 2007 0.08 0.08
Pulp Sulphite 2006 0.08 0.30
Refractory ceramic constructional goods containing >50% 2006 0.08 0.37
of MgO, CaO or Cr2O3 including bricks, blocks and tiles 
excluding goods of siliceous fossil meals or earths, 
tubing and piping
Acrylic 2006 0.08 0.18
Pulp CTMP 2006 0.08 0.46
Pulp Sulphate 2006 0.08 0.43
continued
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TABLE 8. Assessment of risk of carbon leakage in EU-27 by industry
PRODCOM classification. 2006
continued Total CO
2
Product Year cost/price ratio (X+M)/
(year average) (P+M)
Polychlorure de vinyle, sans mélange, sous formes 2006 0.08 0.15
primaires
Medium density fibreboard (MDF) 2006 0.07 0.14
Ferro-manganese 2006 0.07 0.51
Pulp for newsprint ground-wood 2006 0.07 0.27
Paper uncoated sulphite 2006 0.07 0.15
Ethylene 2006 0.07 N/A
Drinking glasses of toughened glass gathered (including 2006 0.07 0.37
cut or otherwise decorated) (excluding of lead crystal)
Ferro-chromium 2006 0.06 0.81
Polyester 2006 0.06 0.48
Packaging RCF testliner 2006 0.06 0.08
Paper uncoated sulphate 2006 0.06 0.15
High Density Polyethylene - HDPE 2006 0.06 0.33
Low-Density Polyethylene - LDPE 2006 0.06 0.23
Sodium hydroxide 2006 0.05 0.05
Wire Rod 2006 0.05 0.21
Seamless hollow profiles and seamless tubes and 2006 0.05 0.26
pipes, of non-circular cross-section, hot or cold 
finished, of steel
Seamless tubes and pipes, of circular cross-section, 2006 0.05 0.60
of steel other than stainless steel, hot finished, 
of an external diameter > 406.4 mm
Seamless tubes and pipes, of circular cross-section, 2006 0.05 0.86
of steel other than stainless steel, hot finished, 
of an external diameter > 168.3 mm but < 406.4 mm
Seamless tubes and pipes, of circular cross-section, 2006 0.05 0.42
of steel other than stainless steel, hot finished, 
of an external diameter < 168.3 mm
Seamless tubes and pipes, of circular cross-section, 2006 0.05 0.37
of steel other than stainless steel, cold drawn or cold 
rolled (excl. precision tubes and pipes)
Seamless precision tubes and pipes, of circular 2006 0.05 0.21
cross-section, of steel other than stainless steel, 
cold drawn or cold rolled
Rebar 2006 0.05 0.16
Non-wired sheets of float glass and surface ground 2006 0.04 0.04
or polished glass, having a non reflecting layer
continued
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TABLE 8. Assessment of risk of carbon leakage in EU-27 by industry
PRODCOM classification. 2006
continued Total CO
2
Product Year cost/price ratio (X+M)/
(year average) (P+M)
Ceramic pipes, conduits, guttering and pipe fittings: 2006 0.04 0.17
drain pipes and guttering with fittings
Paper for newsprint RCF 2006 0.04 0.23
Nylon 2006 0.04 0.35
Particle Board of Wood 2006 0.04 0.10
Drinking glasses gathered by hand (including cut or 2006 0.03 0.18
otherwise decorated) (excluding of lead crystal, 
of toughened glass, of glass-ceramics)
Refined unwrought lead (excluding lead powders 2006 0.03 0.22
or flakes)
Open glass envelopes for electric lamps, 2006 0.03 0.35
cathode-ray tubes or the like
Glass fibre threads cut into lengths of at least 2006 0.03 0.29
3 mm but <= 50 mm (chopped strands)
Packaging RCF cartonboard 2006 0.03 0.37
Glass fibre filaments (including rovings) 2006 0.03 0.38
Unwrought lead containing antimony 2006 0.03 0.08
(excluding lead powders or flakes)
Glass cubes and other glass smallwares, 2006 0.03 0.32
for mosaic or similar decorative purposes excluding 
finished panels and other decorative motifs 
made from mosaic cubes
Raw cane and beet sugar in solid form; 2006 0.03 0.53
not containing added flavouring or colouring matter
Unwrought lead (excluding lead powders or flakes, 2006 0.03 0.56
unwrought lead containing antimony, refined)
Table/kitchen glassware (excluding drinking), 2006 0.03 0.73
toughened glass
White refined cane or beet sugar in a solid form 2006 0.03 0.33
(excluding white sugar)
Ductile iron castings for transmission shafts, 2006 0.03 0.19
crankshafts, camshafts and cranks 
Paving blocks... of glass, for building 2006 0.02 0.35
or construction purposes, n.e.c.
Tissue RCF 2006 0.02 0.08
Table/kitchen glassware with linear coefficient 2006 0.02 0.35
of expansion <=5x10-6/K, temperature range of 0 °C 
to 300 °C excluding of glass-ceramics, lead 
crystal/toughened glass, drinking glasses
continued
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TABLE 8. Assessment of risk of carbon leakage in EU-27 by industry
PRODCOM classification. 2006
continued Total CO
2
Product Year cost/price ratio (X+M)/
(year average) (P+M)
Oriented Strand Board (OSB) 2006 0.02 0.22
Zinc metal 2006 0.02 0.21
Slivers; yarns and chopped strands of filaments 2006 0.02 0.23
of glass fibres (excluding glass fibre threads cut into 
lengths of at least 3 mm but <= 50 mm)
Cut or otherwise decorated drinking glasses 2006 0.02 0.11
of lead crystal gathered mechanically
Drinking glasses of lead crystal gathered 2006 0.02 0.88
mechanically (excluding cut or otherwise decorated)
Plywood 2006 0.02 0.41
Articles of non-malleable cast-iron n.e.c. 2006 0.02 0.64
Nonwoven glass fibre webs; felts; mattresses 2006 0.02 0.12
and boards
Other articles of glass fibre, of non-textile fibres, 2006 0.02 0.11
bulk, flocks, others
Potassium chloride 2006 0.02 0.33
Refined unwrought lead (excluding lead powders 2006 0.02 0.22
or flakes)
Glass fibre mats (including of glass wool) 2006 0.02 0.21
Tissue virgin pulp 2006 0.02 0.08
Signalling glassware and optical elements of glass, 2006 0.01 0.41
not optically worked
Unwrought lead containing antimony (excluding lead 2006 0.01 0.08
powders or flakes)
Stainless Cold Rolled 2006 0.01 0.33
Potassium sulphate 2006 0.01 0.04
Unwrought lead (excluding lead powders or flakes, 2006 0.01 0.56
unwrought lead containing antimony, refined)
Unworked glass tubes (including tubes which have 2006 0.01 0.20
had fluorescent material added to them in the mass) 
(excluding tubes coated inside with fluorescent material)
Glass electrical insulators (excluding insulating 2006 0.01 0.64
fittings (other than insulators) for electrical machinery; 
appliances or equipment)
Other articles of glass fibre, pads, casings 2006 0.01 0.07
for insulating tubes or pipes
Glass fibre voiles (including of glass wool) 2006 0.01 0.15
Glass fibre articles of textile fibres 2006 0.01 0.33
continued
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TABLE 8. Assessment of risk of carbon leakage in EU-27 by industry
PRODCOM classification. 2006
continued Total CO
2
Product Year cost/price ratio (X+M)/
(year average) (P+M)
Seamless tubes and pipes, of circular cross-section, 2006 0.01 0.24
of stainless steel
Laboratory, hygienic or pharmaceutical glassware 2006 0.01 0.16
whether or not graduated
Unwrought unalloyed refined copper (excluding rolled, 2006 0.01 0.45
extruded or forged sintered products)
Extrusion Aluminium 2006 0.01 0.14
Glass smallware (including beads, imitation 2006 0.01 0.30
pearls/stones, ...)
Recycled Aluminium 2006 0.01 0.06
Rolling Aluminium 2006 0.00 0.27
Table or kitchen glassware of lead crystal gathered 2006 0.00 0.37
by hand (excluding of glass-ceramics, of toughened 
glass, drinking glasses)
Clock or watch glasses, glasses for spectacles, 2006 0.00 0.36
not optically worked
Staple glass fibre articles 2006 0.00 0.77
Non-alloy unwrought nickel (excluding nickel powders 2006 0.00 0.71
and flakes
Cut or otherwise decorated drinking glasses of lead 2006 0.00 0.57
crystal gathered by hand
Nickel mattes, nickel oxide sinters and other 2006 0.00 0.67
intermediate products of nickel metallurgy (including 
impure nickel oxides, nickel speiss, impure ferro-nickel)
Nickel powders and flakes (excluding nickel 2006 0.00 0.30
oxide sinters)
Source: Based on European Commission data.
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TABLE 9. National targets, non-ETS sector
Target, based on
Country Emissions GPD Combination 
per capita per capita (1) + (2)
Austria -13% -16% -14%
Belgium -18% -15% -17%
Bulgaria -1% 20% 9%
Cyprus -17% -5% -11%
Czech Republic -16% 9% -4%
Denmark -14% -20% -17%
Estonia -18% 11% -3%
Finland -15% -16% -16%
France -2% -14% -8%
Germany -14% -14% -14%
Greece -15% -5% -10%
Hungary 5% 10% 7%
Ireland -20% -20% -20%
Italy -7% -13% -10%
Latvia 20% 15% 18%
Lithuania 11% 15% 13%
Luxembourg -20% -20% -20%
Malta -18% 5% -6%
Netherlands -19% -16% -18%
Poland -9% 14% 3%
Portugal 2% 1% 2%
Romania 10% 19% 14%
Slovakia -1% 13% 6%
Slovenia -7% 1% -3%
Spain -12% -10% -11%
Sweden 3% -17% -7%
United Kingdom -13% -16% -14%
Source: Governo Italiano (2008), Italian position on the energy and climate change package.
